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GLOBUS: A PROLIFIC GENERATOR OF NICE QUESTIONS
Federal Common Law: There is a general federal common law; Contri-
bution: Contribution among joint tortfeasors under 10b-5 and Clayton
Act § 4; Statutes of Limitation: Application by reference of the express
limitations of the Securities Exchange Act to actions brought under 10b-5.
I. INTRODUCTION
The litigation generated by section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act has had a great deal to do with the congestion of federal courts.1 Sec-
tion 10(b) does not expressly provide for a private right of action but has
been construed as implicitly creating a private right of action sounding in
tort.2 This construction follows from the tort principle that a private right
of action may be implied from a statute in favor of those whose interests
the statute was designed to protect.3 Besides the delicate and knotty
problems involved in interpreting the substantive aspects of private rights
of action under § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 issued pursuant thereto, there
are two rather important ancillary questions which continue to generate
confusion. First, is there a right of contribution between tortfeasors held
jointly liable under § 10(b), and second, what statute of limitations
applies to these actions? A recent decision, Globus, Inc. v. Law Research
Services, Inc.,4 may supply the principles with which to answer both of
these questions.
The original suit5 underlying the opinion in Globus, Inc. v. Law Re-
search Services, Inc. was a lOb-5 action by Globus and other purchasers of
an original issue of stock against the issuer, Law Research Services, Inc.
(hereinafter LRS), and the president of the issuer, Ellias C. Hoppenfeld,
and against the underwriters, Blair & Co. (hereinafter Blair). The com-
plaint, based on § 17 (a) of the Securities Act of 19330 (hereinafter the
1933 Act), § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 19347 (hereinafter
the 1934 Act), and common law fraud, alleged material omissions in the
offering circular by which the stock was offered to the public. LRS was
formed to engage in the business of providing computerized legal research
services. The offering circular prepared in connection with LRS's public
IA. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW FRAUID-SEC RULE 10B-5, at 347, 501 (1967). The
table of cases originally included in this service lists slightly over 300 cases under 1ob-5 decided In
federal courts as of 1967. The 1969 supplement to the table of cases lists over 250 additional
10b-5 cases
2 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 286 (1965).
4 318 F. Supp. 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) aff'd, 442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir 1971), cart. denied, 404
U.S. 941 (1971).
5 Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., 287 F. Supp. 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), af'd in
part & rev'd in part 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970).
015 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
7 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1970).
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offering of stock8 prominently featured a valuable contract between IRS
and Sperry Rand Corporation for the use of one of Sperry Rand's comput-
ers. The circular, however, did not indicate that Sperry Rand had termi-
nated service under the contract because of serious contract disputes with
LRS.
After a ten day trial on the merits, the jury returned a verdict for all
defendants on the state common law fraud counts and against all defen-
dants on the federal securities law counts and awarded compensatory and
punitive damages. The action was brought in the federal courts because of
the federal court's exclusive jurisdiction over actions based on the 1934
Act? Since the action was between Globus, Inc., a New York corporation,
and Law Research Services, Inc., a corporation doing business in New York,
the state common law fraud element of the action was based on the common
law of New York, but this state law element was pendent to the federal
question raised by the securities law action. Since the jury found for the
defendants on the state issue of common law fraud, the judgment rendered
against the defendants rested entirely on federal securities law.
Also at issue in the case were various cross-daims between the defen-
dants. On the underwriter's cross-claim against the two other defendants
for indemnity, the jury decided for the underwriter, Blair, based on an in-
demnity clause in the underwriting agreement. The trial judge sustained
a motion to set aside the verdict on the cross-claim for indemnity on the
grounds that Blair knew of the material omissions and enforcement of the
indemnity clause would, "dilute the deterrent impact of the securities
laws."'1 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the judg-
ment in all respects except for the award of punitive damages which it re-
versed.:"
Subsequent to the affirmation by the appellate court, Blair paid the judg-
ment in full and sought contribution from Hoppenfeld and LRS. In
Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Services, Inc., which is the opinion on Blair's
motion, Judge Frankel granted contribution among joint tortfeasors in a
lob-5 action, where one of the judgment debtors had paid the full amount
of the judgment.
As indicated, the liability of the three defendants was based totally on
federal securities law and the validity of defendants' contractual agreement
for indemnification was determined solely on the basis of federal policy.
Nevertheless, New York law might have been used to determine the issue
8 The offering was made under Regulation A. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 to 230.263 (1956).
9 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1970). "The district courts of the United States ... shall have exdu-
sive jurisdiction of violations of this chapter... and of all suits in equity and actions at law
brought to enforce any liability or duty created by this chapter or the rules and regulations there-
under."
10 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.q.Y. 1970).
11418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 1969).
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of contribution between the defendants, but the common law of New
York, as elsewhere, does not permit contribution. 2 New York has a joint
judgment act,13 but this act applies only where a recovery has been had
against all defendants for a personal injury or property damage, and this
act in derogation of the common law is strictly construed by the New York
courts.14 It seems clear that neither the New York joint judgment act nor
the New York common law would permit contribution in this case and it is
also clear that the Globus opinion did not treat New York law as the ba-
sis for the decision.' 5
Judge Frankel seems to have taken the view expressed by Judge Hastie
in American Dredging Co. v. Gulf Oil Corp.,' that issues ancillary to fed-
erally created rights are federal issues. In that action a shipowner sought
contribution from a riparian owner for damages paid by the shipowner for
the wrongful death of a seaman employed by it. The liability of the ship-
owner was based on the Jones Act,17 and that of the riparian owner on
common law negligence. The court said:
The obligation which libellant has satisfied and respondents are now
asked to share . .. (is) . . . a federally created right under the Jones Act.
In these circumstances state law did not and could not play any part in im-
posing liability on libellant. By the same token attendant and incidental
obligations in the nature of rights over against others are derived, if at
all, from the same source. The entire complex of substantive rights thus
arising in this maritime cause is a creation of national law.18
If it is accepted, as it seems it must be accepted, that Globus was de-
cided on the basis of federal law, then the result seems explainable in only
two ways and indeed the opinion seems to rest squarely on both ap-
proaches. The first is that the case gives effect to a federal common law
right of contribution. The validity of this approach necessitates the con-
dlusion that there is federal common law and that this is an appropriate
case for its application. The second approach is that the portions of the
1934 Act which expressly provide for a right of contribution are properly
"incorporated by reference" in to § 10(b) of the 1.934 Act. A third pos-
sible explanation, that is, that the applicable state law was merely adopted
as the federal rule, is necessarily negated by the results of the opinion.
-
2 Badach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d 128 (1959).
13 N.Y. CIV. PRAC. § 1401 (1964).
14 Baidach v. Togut, 7 N.Y.2d 128 (1959).
16 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 n.2 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). "There is no basis for doubting that the
subject of contribution, like indeminity (as has been held in this case), is governed here by
federal law."
16 175 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
1"46 U.S.C. § 688 (1970).
18 175 F. Supp. 882, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1959). In this case the court denied contribution on
the grounds that the national maritime law as expressed in Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling
& Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282 (1952), would not permit contribution in non-collision cases.
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II. CONTRIBUTION AS A MATTER OF
FEDERAL COMMON LAW
An important question developed by viewing the Globus decision as
granting contribution on the basis of federal common law is how far such
a decision should reach. That is, if Judge Frankel has exercised basic rule
making power, has he created a rule limited in its application to cases un-
der the implied rights of action fostered by the 1934 Act or has he created
a rule which can be extended to encompass a federal common law rule of
contribution of general application to all federal torts? The answer to this
question depends, to a great extent, upon the source of the rule making
power.
A. The Development of Federal Common Law
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins19 does not exclude the possibility of a federal
common law. The statement, "There is no federal general common law,"
must be put in perspective. The doctrine of Erie is a limitation on the
jurisdiction of federal courts, in the sense that jurisdiction is "the power
to make, declare, or apply the law."20 The powers of jurisdiction limited
by Erie were the powers exercised by federal courts under the doctrine of
Swift v. Tyson."- Following the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, federal courts
freely exercised what are essentially regarded as the powers of common law
courts, i.e., they fashioned substantive rules of decisions absent constitu-
tional or statutory direction.
The extent of the common law powers of federal courts prior to Swift
v. Tyson was a matter of some uncertainty. In the early stages after the
adoption of the Constitution, federal courts began to develop a federal com-
mon law of crimes. By 1812, however, federal common law criminal ju-
risdiction had all but ended.2  At the same time, however, there seems
generally to have been presumed a national common law in civil matters
applied concurrently by state and federal courts. Deference was given to
state court decisions by the Supreme Court, but whether this was a matter
of acquiescence or compelled by statute or the Constitution was undear.
There emerged certain areas in which the federal courts felt compelled to
follow the state decisions. These were deemed purely local matters and
included title to land, construction of wills, statutes of limitations and
fraud.24
In 1842 Swift v. Tyson defined the limits of the federal common law
19 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
20 Comment, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, 79 YALE L. 284, 289 (1969).
2141 U.S. (16Pet.) 1 (1842).
22 United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 32 (1812).
2 3 Comment, Swift v. Tyson Exhumed, supra note 19, at 291.
24 Id. at 293.
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power and gave it a foundation which supported it for nearly a century.
Federal courts in the absence of state statutes were to have the power to
determine the just rule of general commercial law upon the "general prin-
ciples and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence" without the requirement
of deference to the decisions of the state tribunals. This power was
founded not on the Constitution, but on what was believed to be the na-
ture of law itself.
The existence of concurrent common law powers over the same subject
matter in both state and federal courts, combined with diversity jurisdic-
tion, led to intolerable difficulties. State courts were not bound by the com-
mon law decisions of the federal courts, but remained free to reach their
own conclusions as to the just rule. This lead invariably to the well-known
problem of "forum shopping" in diversity actions.
Erie effected a limitation on federal jurisdiction by overruling Swift v,
Tyson. The underlying philosophy of Swift v. Tyson was declared a fal-
lacy: "[L]aw . . .does not exist without some definite authority behind
it." 5 The authority of the federal government and, therefore, its courts to
make substantive rules is derived from the Constitution and not from a
philosophy of the law. "Congress has no power to declare substantive
rules of common law applicable in a State whether they be local in nature
or 'general,' be they commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no
clause in the Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the fed-
eral courts." 26
Much writing has dealt with the general nature of federal common
law power after Erie. All agree that when Erie applies, state law gov-
erns even in the federal courts and any attempt on the part of such courts
independently to fashion substantive rules of decision would be an un-
constitutional usurpation of state power. The question of national com-
mon law arises in those areas outside the reach of Erie and ipso facto
outside the reach of independent state competence where the national
legislature has not yet exercised its power by enacting statutory rules of
decision. It is in this area that the federal courts are put to the task of
determining the nature and extent of their own power as common law
tribunals.
B. The Approaches to Federal Common Law
Judge Friendly seems to have favored an expansive role for the federal
common law based on his reading of Textile Workers of America v. Lin-
coin Mills.27 His approach would depend upon affirmative action by Con-
25304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
261d. at 78.
27353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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gress to establish areas of federal common law competence.28  Professor
Albert Hill's point of view is that within the area which is outside Erie,
yet untouched by federal legislation, the law making power of the federal
courts depends upon some type of federal preemption, arising from a fed-
eral statute or the Constitution. Hill argues that though the areas of
federal judicial law making power are limited by the areas of preemption,
within the areas in which federal courts legitimately exercise power, their
power is not qualitatively different from that of state judicial power.'
In an article entitled, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence
and Discretion in the Choice of National and State Rules For Decision."
Paul J. Mishkin puts the emphasis on the power of federal courts to choose
local law as the applicable federal rule. He foresees uniformity and pre-
dictability arising from the development of a national body of choice of law
rules which could be "established on a firm base-and kept up-to-date--
by fewer Supreme Court decisions. .. .
Another author argues that within this area outside the reach of Erie
the constraints of federalism impose a presumption in favor of applying
state law. Under this analysis the federal power to formulate substantive
rules in this area is limited to cases in which the presumption has been "un-
dermined" by the needs of national sovereignty or by congressional dele-
gation of law making authority or where the presumption has been "over-
riden" by federal policy or the need for uniformity.
There are applications of post-Erie federal common law which are con-
sistent with these various approaches. Textile Workers Union of Amer-
ica v. Lincoln Mills" exemplifies one area in which federal courts exercise
common law powers. In this case involving the question of whether or
not federal courts could compel arbitration pursuant to a collective-bar-
gaining agreement, the court eschewed the common law rule against en-
forcement of executory agreements to arbitrate and proceeded to develop
applicable federal contract rules, saying, "We conclude that the substan-
tive law to apply in suits under § 301 (a) [Labor Management Relations
Act] is federal law, which the courts must fashion from the policy of our
national labor laws." 33
The court found its mandate to fashion such rules in a presumed intent
2s Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of The New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.. REV.
383 (1964).
29 Hil, The Law-Making Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemptfion, 67
COLUK L REV. 1024 (1967).
30 105 U. PA. L REV. 797 (1957).
31 Id. at 832.
32353 U.S. 448 (1957).
33 Id. at 456. See § 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C, § 185
(1970).
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on the part of Congress to occupy the whole field of labor law.8 Such
an intent is interpreted to effect a congressional or statutory preemption of
the rule making power within that area of the law. The action of the fed-
eral courts in fashioning such rules, however, is not merely that of statu-
tory interpretation. The court in Lincoln Mills recognized that some of
the rule making will "lack express statutory sanction"8 but will nonethe-
less be authorized by the fact of preemption.
In Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co.,,0 federal
courts exercised common law powers from the mere fact of federalism.
The decision in this case was handed down on the same day as Erie. The
Court's opinion, given through Justice Brandeis who also wrote the Erie
decision, said, "For whether the water of an interstate stream must be
apportioned between the two States is a question of 'federal common law'
upon which neither the statutes nor the decisions of either state can be
conclusive."37  The dispute was between citizens of Colorado and New
Mexico over water rights in an interstate stream. Brandeis, without ref-
erence to any federal statute or specific constitutional provision, based the
court's rule making power on the needs of federalism.
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co.38 illustrates another aspect of federal
court's common law power. It was this decision which established that § 10
of the 1934 Act and Rule 10b-5 provide a private right of action to mem-
bers of the class for whose special benefit the statute was enacted. Judge
Kirkpatrick made it plain that he did not imply this right of action by stat-
utory interpretation alone. He speaks principally of "what the general law
implies," and quotes from the Restatement of Torts."9 Implementation of
a cause of action on the basis of the general law is the type of power as-
sociated with common law courts. This function was recognized as an
,exercise of federal common law powers in Justice Brennan's dissent in
Wheeldin v. Wheeler.40
[11n a wide variety of cases federal courts have assumed to fashion common-
law rights. Ordinarily, to be sure, such fashioning is done under the aegis
of a more specific jurisdictional grant than 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). But I
. * would recognize the existence of federal common-law rights of action
"wherever necessary or appropriate" for dealing with "essentially federal
matters." 41
34 See Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512 (1969), for argument that
§ 301 does not justify attributing a preemptive intent to Congress.
35 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
86 304 U.S. 92 (1938).
371d. at 110.
3869 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
39 d. at 513.




Wlheeldin was an attempt on the part of petitioner to get money damages
from a federal officer for abuse of Congressional subpoena power. The
abuse was clearly established and the action was deemed properly before
the court on federal question jurisdiction, but the complaint was dismissed
for failure to state a cause of action. The majority opinion distinguished
this case from the implied preemption areas such as labor law and refused
to exercise common-law power to establish a cause of action for petitioner:
As respects the creation by the federal courts of common-law rights, it is
perhaps needless to state that we are not in the free-wheeling days antedat-
ing Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins .... [I]t is difficult for us to see how the
present statute, which only grants power to issue subpoenas, implies a
cause of action for abuse of that power.2
The conflict between the majority and dissenting opinions in this case
illustrates a pivotal point in the development of federal common law pow-
ers. The majority refused to find a federal cause of action for abuse of
the subpoena power because it could not gleen a Congressional intent to
create such a cause from the language of the statute. This approach re-
stricts the federal courts' power of remedial implementation to that of
statutory interpretation. Justice Brennan, however, would not so limit
the.federal courts. Under his "necessary or appropriate" test expressed
in the passage from his dissent in Wheeldin quoted above, a federal
court could find a cause of action implied by a statute without finding a
Congressional intention to create such a cause of action. Brennan's dis-
senting opinion is, in this respect, much more in line with the reasoning of
Kardon.
The difference is subtle, but dramatic. Operating under the majority
principle, no general federal rule could be established because each rule
laid down would derive its force only from the statute interpreted. Beyond
actions based on that statute it could not have the force of law. Whereas,
rules founded upon Brennan's test or the Kardon opinion, because they are
derived from general principles, may have coercive effect beyond the stat-
ute under which they arise.
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States43 is the principal case illustrating
an area of federal judicial law making justified by the proprietary interests
of the United States. The case involved a suit by the United States
against Clearfield Trust Co. for paying a government check on a forged
indorsement. The district court had ruled that Pennsylvania law governed
and that since the United States had unreasonably delayed in giving notice
of the forgery to Clearfield it was barred from recovery. That decision,
however, was reversed in the circuit court and the Supreme Court affirmed,
42 d. at 651. The Supreme Courts refusal to imply a federal cause of action for abuse of
the subpoena power does not negate a state cause of action on the same grounds.
43 318 U.S. 363 (1943).
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stating that Erie did not apply and "in absence of an applicable Act of Con-
gress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law ac-
cording to their own standards." 44
Relying on pre-Erie cases, the Court concluded that the federal rule
was that the drawee would be barred from recovery for delay in giving no-
tification only upon a clear showing that the delay caused damages to the
party paying over a forged indorsement. The authority of the federal
courts to fashion common law rules to protect the proprietary interests of
the United States seems to have been derived generally from the Consti-
tution and the statutes of the United States.
The type of judicial law making found here is to be distinguished from
that in the areas of statutory and Constitutional preemption. Here
neither the Constitution nor any statute has reserved the area of negotiable
instrument law for the federal government. It is only the fact that the fed-
eral government has a proprietary and monetary interest in its own checks
which justifies the actions of federal courts in fashioning common law
rules for their governance:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast scale
and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will commonly
occur in several states. The application of state law, even without the
conflict of laws rules of the forum, would subject the rights and duties
of the United States to exceptional uncertainty. 45
Clearfield does not seem to depend on any theory of either Constitu-
tional or legislative preemption, but on a balancing of federal and state
interests. Such a balancing for the purpose of determining whether to
create a federal rule was expressly stated as the grounds for decision in
Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp.,48 a case in which the balance,
however, was found to favor the application of state law. Valls in-
volved oil lease rights to several "mud lumps" or islands owned by the
United States and located in the mouth of the Mississippi. Wallis had
made application for a lease to exploit the tracts under the Mineral Leas-
ing Act for Acquired Lands. 47 He subsequently sold Pan American an op-
tion to acquire any lease he might acquire under the application. Con-
cerned that his application might have been wrongly filed, Wallis made a
new application under the Mineral Leasing Act of 192048 and was even-
tually awarded a lease pursuant thereto. Pan American and another in-
terested party then brought diversity suits against Wallis to compel Wallis
to perform the option agreements. The district judge held that Louisiana
44 Id. at 367.
45d.
48384 U.S. 63 (1966).
4730 U.S.C. §§ 351-359 (1970).
4830 U.S.C. §§ 181 etseq. (1970).
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law governed the option agreements and that under Louisiana law a writ-
ten agreement was required to transfer any interest in a mineral lease. The
court then awarded judgment to Wallis on the grounds that the written
agreements only applied to leases obtained under the Mineral Leasing Act
for Acquired Lands and not for leases acquired under any other law. Be-
fore the Supreme Court, respondents argued that "the federal interest in
government-granted mineral leases requires supplanting Louisiana law, in
which event the federal rule would normally govern any such case whether
in state or federal court."'4
The Constitution does not expressly grant to Congress or the federal
courts power to preempt the whole area of law dealing with transfer and
assignment of leases; however, the federal proprietary interest in its own
lands could, by analogy to Clearfield, be conceived as implying preemp-
tion in matters concerning rights to leased federal land. Speaking of this
possibility, the Court said:
In deciding whether rules of federal common law should be fashioned,
normally the guiding principle is that a significant conflict between some
federal policy or interest and the use of state law in the premises must
first be specifically shown. It is by no means enough that, as we may as-
sume, Congress could under the Constitution readily enact a complete
code of law governing transactions in federal mineral leases among pri-
vate parties. Whether latent federal power should be exercised to dis-
place state law is primarily a decision for Congress. Even where there
is related federal legislation in an area, as is true in this instance, it must
be remembered that "Congress acts . . . against the background of the
total corpus juris of the states .... 50
C. The Power of Federal Courts to Fashion Common Law
Rules as a Choice of Laws Problem
W'allis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. suggests the need to look at
the matter from the other side. Given a problem requiring a substantive
rule which is outside the reach of Erie, but has not been considered by
Congress, what considerations have influenced the federal courts not to
fashion a federal rule? Put differently: What limitations have the federal
courts established for their own law making abilities and what considera-
tions have influenced the creation of these limitations? Wheeldin v.
Wheeler and Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum Corp. were two instances
in which a federal court declined the opportunity to fashion a substantive
rule. In Wheeldin the Court declined because it could not imply from
a statute granting subpoena power, a cause of action for abuse of that
power. In Wallis the Court expressed its belief that the proprietary in-
terests of the United States would not justify fashioning a federal rule
49384 U.S. 63, 67 (1966).
501d. at 68 (emphasis supplied).
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absent a clear showing of significant conflict between state law and federal
policy.
The opinion in Clearfield points to another consideration which influ-
ences federal courts to decline to fashion a uniform federal rule. "In our
choice of the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state
law."51  This choice is never compelled by Erie, but is influenced by the
kinds of considerations which led to Erie. Once the choice is made, the
state law becomes the applicable federal rule for that state. Such a case
is De Sylva v. Ballentine52 in which the Supreme Court turned to the state
domestics relation law to determine if the illegitimate son of a copyright
proprietor is one of the "children" of the proprietor within the meaning of
the copyright statute.
Another case in which the federal courts refused to fashion a federal
cause of action based upon federal proprietary interests was United States
v. Standard Oil Co.,5 3 which was cited in Justice Brennan's dissent in
Wheeldin. This suit involved an attempt by the United States to recover
damages for the loss of services of one of its soldiers, John Etzel, resulting
from injuries sustained by Etzel when one of respondent's trucks struck
him at an intersection in Los Angeles.
The Court was quite clear in its belief that this case was not within
the reach of Erie and that the federal courts had the power to fashion a
rule:
As in the Clearfield case, ... quite apart from any positive action by Con-
gress, the matter in issue is neither primarily one of state interest nor ex-
clusively for determination by state law within the spirit and purpose of
the Erie decision. The great object of the Erie case was to secure in the
federal courts, in diversity cases, the application of the same substantive
law as would control if the suit were brought in the courts of the state
where the federal court sits. It was the so-called "federal common law"
utilized as a substitute for state power, to create and enforce legal rela-
tionships in the area set apart in our scheme for state xather than for fed-
eral control, that the Erie decision threw out. Its object and effect were
thus to bring federal judicial power under subjection to state authority in
matters essentially of local interest and state control.
... [A]lthough federal judicial power to deal with common-law
problems was cut down in the realm of liability or its absence governable
by state law, that power remained unimpaired for dealing independent-
ly, wherever necessary or appropriate, with essentially federal matters,
even though Congress has not acted affirmatively about the specific ques-
tion.54
The court was also of the opinion that state law should not be selected
as the federal rule for this matter:
51318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943).
52351 U.S. 570 (1956).




And because those matters ordinarily are appropriate for uniform national
treatment rather than diversified local disposition, as well where Con-
gress has not acted affirmatively as where it has, they are more fittingly
determinable by independent federal judicial decision than by reference
to varying state policies.m
Nonetheless, the court did not act to create this new common law liability,
apparently feeling that its powers of independent judicial rule making
were more limited than those of state courts even with regard to matters
clearly within the federal ambiance: "But in the federal scheme our part
in that work, and the part of the other federal courts, outside the constitu-
tional area is more modest than that of state courts, particularly in the free-
dom to create new common-law liabilities. .. ."50 What clearly is lacking
in this survey of approaches to the exercise of judicial law making powers
by the federal courts is a unifying, governing principle. It is not even evi-
dent from what source such a principle should be derived. As the fed-
eral government expands its range of activity it comes increasingly into
contact with the private sector. These contacts generate larger and larger
amounts of litigation which increasingly involve legal questions for which
neither Erie nor the federal statutes provide answers. Caught between two
sovereign sources of the law, the federal courts must choose one set of
laws and apply it.
Clearly federal courts exercise common law powers. The problem is
how broadly that powdr should sweep. It is at the least a misplaced em-
phasis to attempt to solve that problem by attempting to define the nature
of the federal common law power. What is at issue is the choice between
federal common law and state law and in order to infuse a unifying prin-
ciple into the problem of the exercise of federal common law power atten-
tion should be focused upon developing a rational set of considerations to
govern the choice. That is to say the question of the common law rule
making power of the federal courts may be distilled to a type of conflicts
of laws problem and the answers to this question may be found by refer-
ence to traditional conflicts considerations. The various rationales dis-
played in the cases that have beea discussed may be viewed as no more
than conflicts stategies designed to harmonize the new developments in
this area with the more constitutionally and statutorially based areas of
federal judicial power.
A statement made by Professor Leflar in an article dealing with con-
flicts of laws seems particularly applicable to the present state of judicial
development of approaches to the exercise of federal common law power:
[Fllexibility is available, even with so-called rules, because there really is no
rule. It is in such areas that the search for truly relevant considerations,
5Id. at 311.
56 Id. at 313.
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and frank recognition of their controlling effect, is particularly needed.
The variety is already there, presumably as it should be, but what is lack-
ing is a reasonably clear explanation of what it is that justifies now one
choice of law and next a different one.57
In his article, Professor Leflar distills from the body of conflicts law
five basic choice of law considerations which should be taken as guides to
solutions of choice of law problems:
A. Predictability of results;
B. Maintenance of interstate and international order;
C. Simplification of the judicial task;
D. Advancement of the forum's governmental interests;
E. Application of the better rule of law."
A frank tecognition of the relevance of these or similar considerations
to the choice between federal and state law could reduce the wisdom in
this area to a set of manageable principles upon which federal courts could
rely to develop a set of federal common law principles which rationally
relate to national policy.
The fear of the impact of unrestrained judicial law making on our con-
stitutional system of separation of powers has played a part in prompting
the federal courts to foster self-imposed limitations on their common law
powers. This consideration was alluded to by the majority in United
States v. Standard Oil Co. of California:
In view of these considerations, exercise of judicial power to establish the
new liability not only would be intruding within a field properly within
Congress' control and as to a matter concerning which it has seen fit
to take no action. To accept the challenge, making the liability effective
in this case, also would involve a possible element of surprise, in view of
the settled contrary practice, which action by Congress would avoid .... 
Indeed, the need to keep viable the legislative processes inherent in our
federal constitutional system, in order to protect the justifiable reliance in-
terests of the public from possible unfair surprise arising from judicial law
making, should be added as an additional choice-influencing consideration
to be weighed with the conflicts considerations in making the choice be-
tween federal common law and state law. For this reason federal judicial
common law making should proceed slowly, always keeping in fairly close
contact with legislative and constitutional developments,
As indicated earlier, however, Judge Frankel may have done more than
create a rule limited in its application to cases under the implied rights of
action fostered by the 1934 Act. The rule created by this decision was not
merely a matter of interpretation of the '34 Act, nor was the power to
57Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U.L. REV. 267, 326
(1966).
581d. at 282.
59 332 U.S. 301, 316 (1947).
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create the rule derived from a presumption of Congressional intent to oc-
cupy the area of securities law. The choice to create the rule was influenced
by much more general considerations than that and there is no reason to
think that the rule of Globus is anything less than a federal general com-
mon law rule of contribution.
There can be federal common law of general application which is not
in conflict with the Erie doctrine and a rule of contributions which is ap-
plicable to all federally created tort actions, if such has been created by
Globus, would be such a rule. But the nature of the problem and the
considerations bearing upon the choice must be kept in mind and the fed-
eral courts should not shrink from choosing to make federal common law
when an analysis of "choice-influencing considerations" points to such a
choice.
D. Application of Choice of Laws Principles to the
Question of Contribution
Briefly put, it seems clear that a federal rule of contribution applicable
for all federally created torts would be the proper law to apply using al-
most any choice of law principle. If state law is chosen, predictability is
lost. There are fifty state rules and which applies, more often than not,
will be a matter of doubt. Clearly the judicial task would be simplified
by the uniform application of a federal rule.
Furthermore, federally created tort liability, like all other tort liability
contains both compensatory and deterrent elements. That is to say, in
creating tort liability for certain types of activity, Congress not only in-
tended to compensate those injured by these activities, but also intended
the threatened burden of liability to deter individuals from engaging in
the proscribed course of action. On whom the burden of tort liability falls
and to what extent is often a function of the rule of contribution which is
applied. There is something slightly irrational about permitting the im-
pact of federal securities law to be controlled by a rule developed in a
state legislature or a state court to fit the needs and the policies of, for ex-
ample, the state's motor vehicles laws. State contracts law was not per-
mitted to "dilute the deterrent impact" of the 1933 Act in Globus; dearly
state contribution rules should not be permitted to do so.
E. The Impact of a Federal Common Law Right of Contribution
As indicated, an additional factor in choosing to create a federal com-
mon law rule of contribution is the impact such a choice would have upon
the area of federal torts. There are relatively few federal torts. Some
of these are of statutory creation, such as actions under § 4 of the Clayton
Act, while others have been created by implication in the same manner
as private rights of action under rule lob-5. Discussion of these two
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examples should be sufficient to demonstrate the impact a rule of con-
tribution would have on federal torts.
1. Contribution in 10b-5 Actions
For 10b-5 actions, the status of contribution is in doubt. Globus will
be treated as having established a federal common law tort rule granting a
right of action for contribution among joint tortfeasors. Turning back to
the opinion in Globus, this assumption is supported by the language of
Frankel's opinion. He clearly seems to be making a. common law decision
when he says, "Departing from the rugged flintiness of traditional com-
mon law, the general drift of the law today is toward the allowance of
contribution among joint tortfeasors." 60
Only a few cases other than Globus have dealt with the problem. One,
Shea v. Ungar,61 was decided in the same district as was Globus. Another,
Johns Hopkins University v. Hutton,62 was decided in the District Court of
Maryland.
There are three situations which call for an action to enforce a right
of contribution. First, if a plaintiff brings an action against less than all
of those liable to him, the defendant may seek to join the other potential
defendants under federal rule 14(a). Second, a judgment debtor may
bring an action against potential defendants who were not joined. Third,
a judgment debtor who has paid more than his share of the awarded dam-
ages may try to recover from his judgment co-debtors. The Globus case
involved the third situation. Shea and Johns Hopkins involved the first
situation.
The defendant in Shea, a promoter and organizer of a real estate syndi-
cate, was sued under § 17 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act
and rule lob-5. The defendant had offered and sold to the public in-
terests in a real estate syndicate without revealing that he had made a
$100,000 profit on sale to the syndicate of its sole asset, an office building.
The defendant attempted to join as third-party defendants the two other
members of the syndicate. The decision cited is on a motion by the third-
party defendants to strike the third-party complaint for improper joinder
of the third-party defendants. Since rule 14(a) 3 clearly states that the
liability must run from the third-party defendant to the third-party plain-
tiff before joinder can be had, 64 third-party plaintiff must possess some sub-
60 318 F. Supp. 955, 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). He follows this statement with a long list of
citations from the decisions of state and federal courts; from state statutes; and from PROssBR,
TORTS (3rd ed. 1964).
61 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] 5 91,558 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
6240 F.R.D. 338 (D. Md. 1966).
063 FED. R. CIv. P. 14 (a).
64 3 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACncE g 14.11, at 572 (2d ed. 1968). "Formerly, defendant
could implead the third party for the purpose of showing that he was liable to the plaintiff either
solely or jointly with the defendant, but this provision has been deleted from the rule."
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stantive right as against the third-party defendant upon which to found
an action for joinder under that rule. A right of contribution, where
it exists, would be such a right. The court, however, granted the third-
party defendant's motion to strike, saying:
Since nothing in the Act or Exchange Act creates a right of joinder under
Rule 14 applicable to this case, such right could only arise by virtue of the
substantive law of the State of New York. However, New York substan-
tive law as interpreted by both New York and Federal Courts does not
provide for contribution between active and joint tortfeasors. 65
The judge's statement that absent a specific federal statute granting a
right of contribution, such right could only arise "by virtue of the substan-
tive law of the State of New York" impliedly excludes the power of the
federal court to fashion its own substantive rule. The conclusion reached
in Shea is directly opposite that reached in Globus. The conclusion in
Globus, however, was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and since both cases arose in that Circuit seems to have sub silentio
overruled Shea.
The Johns Hopkins case is another case of the first type and again the
court granted the motion to strike the third party complaint. The opinion
in Johns Hopkins, however, may be support for the Globus conclusion.
In this case Johns Hopkins University brought a 101>-5 action against Hut-
ton, a broker, for alleged misrepresentations in connection with the sale of
certain oil production payments purchased by the university. The factual
issues in this case were very complex. After three years of discovery and
over 1500 pages of depositions, Hutton filed a motion seeking leave to
bring in Johns Hopkins' investment counselor as a third-party defendant.
Allegedly the investment counselor had owned undisclosed interests in the
now bankrupt oil company from which the production payments were pur-
chased. Both Johns Hopkins and the investment counselor resisted de-
fendant's motion. The court apparently concluded that impleader was
proper,6" but denied defendant's motion on the joint ground of laches and
that the proposed third-party complaint would create serious confusion
of issues and unreasonable delay.
Shea and Johns Hopkins read together do not indicate any clear rule.
Against this backdrop the Globus decision which speaks with a dear voice
declaring that there is a federal right of contribution among co-violators
of rule 10b-5 cannot be said to have unduly surprised the defendants or to
have excessively encroached on the legislative function of Congress.
65 Shea v. Ungar, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH F. SEC. L REP. 5 91,558, at 95,108
(S.D.N.Y. 1964).
66 The grounds upon which the court concluded that impleader would be proper are not
disclosed. It should be noted, however, that Maryland law would grant contribution in this
case. 'The right of contribution exists among joint tortfeasors." 11D. ANqN. CoDE art. 50, §
17(a) (1957).
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2. Contribution in Antitrust Actions
Section 4 of the Clayton Act67 provides for private antitrust suits.
Though these actions commonly involve several co-violators, the question
of contribution has arisen in only four reported cases.
In Webster Motor Car Co. v. Zell Motor Car Co., 8 the fourth circuit
indicated that it understood the applicable rule of contribution to be that
of the state where the claim arose. In this case plaintiff brought two con-
spiracy actions against the two members of the alleged conspiracy in dif-
ferent districts. Anticipating full relief in the District of Columbia action
against Packard Motor Company [hereinafter Packard], plaintiff consented
to an order which would dismiss its Maryland action against Zell Motor
Car Co. [hereinafter Zell], with prejudice, upon a favorable determina-
tion in the District of Columbia action. However, when the order was
entered in the Maryland action dismissing Zell, Packard attempted to set
up the dismissal as a defense on appeal. To avoid this defense plaintiff
appealed the order dismissing his Maryland action. In the opinion revers-
ing the dismissal order, the court said:
In this connection it should be remembered that Packard has been found
by the District of Columbia Court to be a co-conspirator with [Zell], and
that, under Maryland law, [Zell] would be liable for contribution to
Packard as joint tort-feasors.6 9
However, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
judgment against Packard on the merits70 which, of course, mooted the is-
sue of contribution.
The second case, Kohn v. Teleprompter Corp.,71 involved an attempt
by private suit defendants to join alleged co-violators under Rule 14(a).
District Judge Dimock granted a motion to vacate the ex parte order per-
mitting service of the third-party complaint on the grounds that the third-
party complaint alleged a separate and independent claim:
It is dear that a substantial part of the complaint, whether or not it states
a sufficient claim, alleges acts which directly injured [the plaintiff]. Rule
14(a) does not provide for impleading a party who is or may be liable
to plaintiff directly. A plaintiff cannot be forced to bring an action
against a person whom it does not wish to sue.7 2
The court then indicated the third-party complaint would be permitted to
stand if it alleged facts substantially the same as the original complaint,
67 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970).
08 234 F.2d 616 (4th Cir. 1956).
0Id. at 619.
7 0 Packard Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.), ceri, denlod,
355 U.S. 822 (1957).




such that would pass on to the third-party defendant liability for all or part
of the claim against the third-party plaintiff. Since nule 14(a) provides
for impleader only of a person "who is or may be liable to him [the third-
party plaintiff] for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against him,"7S the
unstated premise of this dictum is that there is some operative rule of
law such as a right of contribution which will shift liability.
This case, like Globus, came out of the Southern District of New York
and the laws of New York would be applicable if state law were applied.
New York law does not permit contribution in this type of action. To
the extent that this case implies a right of contribution in antitrust cases,
it is authority that federal law is the source of that right.
The case of Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shuberft4 presents the same type prob-
lem as does Kohn. The complaint alleged that defendants monopo-
lized the booking of legitimate theatre in Philadelphia and conspired to
prevent the showing of first run films in plaintiff's theatre. Defendant
sought to join, as third-party defendant, an officer of plaintiff corporation
who had sold the theatre in question to plaintiff corporation. The third-
party complaint alleged that the third-party defendant had, prior to sale of
the theatre, conspired to prevent the showing of first run films in the
theatre, in order to improve the position of other theatres owned by him.
The trial court vacated its order permitting joinder of a third-party on the
grounds that no joint tort was alleged.
The court, however, indicated that both the complaint and the third-
party complaint alleged facts actionable solely by reason of federal law
and that consequently there was "strong justification for [plaintiff's) con-
tention that the tort asserted to lie in the third party complaint is governed
by federal common law with no right of contribution between tort fea-
sors." 75 The Goldlawr court cites Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling &
Refitting Corp.,-" as authority for its view that federal common law does
not allow an action for contribution between joint tortfeasors.
The fourth case which raises the issue of contribution in the context of
an antitrust suit also cites Halcyon to establish that there is no federal right
of contribution. This case is Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President
Lines, Ltd.77 In this action plaintiffs brought suit against 30 defendants for
violation of the Sherman and Clayton Acts. Twenty-five of the defendants
settled with the plaintiff and entered into "covenants not to sue," the other
five defendants refused to settle. The five non-settling defendants filed a
third party complaint against 17 of those who had settled. The third party
complaint alleged the same violations as had the original complaint and
73 FED. P_ CIV. P. 14 (a).
74 276 F.2d 614 (3d Cir. 1960).
75Id. at 616.
'1 342 U.S. 282 (1952).
77298 F. Supp. 1339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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alleged that if these acts had occurred they were joint acts of all the orig-
inal defendants and that the third party defendants would be liable over
to the third party plaintiffs by way of contribution for any liability that
would arise out of their joint acts.
The court recognized that federal rules should govern the issue of con-
tribution and did not consider adopting the local rule as the federal law.
The court maintained that "deep-rooted in our jurisprudence is the com-
mon law rule against contribution. . . . "7' The court found these deep
roots beginning in the pre-Erie case of Union Stock Yards Co. of Omaha
v. Chicago B. & Q R.R.7 ' and appearing again fifty years later in Halcyon.
In Halcyon, Salvador Baccile, an employee of a shoreside contractor,
was injured while making repairs aboard a ship moored in navigable wa-
ters. He sued the shipowner alleging that his injuries were caused by the
shipowner's negligence and the unseaworthiness of the ship. The ship-
owner brought the contractor in as a third-party defendant on the grounds
that the contractor's negligence had contributed to the injuries. The dis-
trict court divided the liability equally between the defendant and the
third-party defendant.
The court of appeals agreed, but limited the amount of the contrac-
tor's liability to that the contractor would have been compelled to pay had
Baccile brought suit under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Com-
pensation Act. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded with instruc-
tions to dismiss the contribution proceedings against the contractor.
The Halcyon Court, however, never attempted to state that the federal
common law rule was against contribution. A close reading of that case
will show that the Court there was asked to do one of two things: extend
to non-collision cases the ancient maritime rule that mutual wrongdoers
share equally the damages sustained by each as well as the liability to third
parties or, in the alternative, fashion a new maritime rule of contribution
for non-collision cases. The Court refused to extend the collision rule and
declined to fashion a new admiralty rule, not because it believed the fed-
eral rule denied a right of contribution but because the Court was not
"wholly convinced that it would best serve the ends of justice."8
As can be seen from these four cases the rule applicable to contribution
in antitrust actions is no more clear than that in 10b-5 actions. The weight
of authority provided by Sabre and Goldlawr and possibly Kohn indicates
that it is federal law which controls this issue. True, in so indicating,
Sabre and Goldlawr interpret the federal law to say that there can be no
contribution between joint tortfeasors, but this interpretation seems to rest
on a misreading of the Halcyon decision. It is more interesting that Sabre
78Id. at 1344.
79 196 U.S. 217 (1905).
80 Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282, 285 (1952).
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and, to a great extent Goldlawr, found federal law to be the applicable
source for a rule with respect to contribution in the area of antitrust viola-
tions and that in so doing they did not find the rule within the narrow
confines of the federal antitrust statutes, but rather in the wider area of
federal tort law.
It appears, then, that in the antitrust field, both on choice of law
grounds and upon consideration of the federal courts' proper role the indi-
cators point toward the creation of a federal rule of contribution."' Sabre
looked to admiralty law for its contributions rule, while Globus drew upon
"the general drift of law today." If Globus is to be viewed as an expres-
sion of general federal common law, Globus may have overturned the
Sabre rule.
F. Conclusion
It is federal policy considerations which have created these liabilities
and any rule which controls the impact of these liabilities should be de-
veloped to serve those policy considerations. Use of varying state rules
developed without regard to the policies behind these federal actions can
only accidentally lead to a desirable result. The development of a federal
rule for contribution specifically designed to advance the policies of fed-
erally created liabilities is more likely to coincide with the requirements of
a rational set of choice-influencing considerations.
Consideration of the impact of federal judicial law making upon our
system requires the federal courts to act with restraint in fashioning new
common law rules. This restraint should act to protect justifiable expec-
tations based upon previous applications of state law and to avoid unneces-
sary surprise as to the content of federal law. This does not, however,
limit federal courts to creating separate rules of decision for each federal
statute. They may fashion general rules applicable in a whole range of
similar statutes without impinging on Congressional or state prerogatives.
That is, federal courts can and do fashion general federal common law
and Globus is a statement of the general federal common law rule of con-
tribution.
III. CONTRIBUTIONS AS A MATTER OF
FEDERAL SEcuITES LAW
A. Incorporation by Reference and the 1934 Act
There is a second way in which the decision in Globus can be read.
Both the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act have sections expressly providing
81See Slain, Risk Distribution and Treble Damages: Insurance and Contribution, 45
N.Y.U.L. REv. 263 (1970) for considerations bearing upon the formation of a contribution
rule for antitrust actions.
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for private rights of action and both of these expressly provide for a right
of contribution. Section 11 of the 1933 Act provides:
[E]very person who becomes liable to make any payment under this sec-
tion may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who,
if sued separately, would have been liable to make the same payment, un-
less the person who has become liable was, and the other was not, guilty of
fraudulent misrepresentation.82
While sections 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act provide:
Every person who becomes liable to make [any] payment under this sec-
tion may recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who,
if joined in the original suit, would have been liable to make the same
payment.83
Quoting from an earlier decision, deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,84 Judge
Frankel wrote, in Globus:
[T]hose sections of the [securities acts] which expressly provide for civil
liability contain express provisions for contribution among intentional
wrongdoers. Since the specific liability provisions of the Act provide for
contribution, it appears that contribution should be permitted when liabil-
ity is implied under Section 10(b).85
In deHaas the court denied a motion to dismiss defendant's claim for
contribution in 10b-5 action on the sole grounds that contribution is pro-
vided for where a cause of action is expressly provided for under the 1934
Act.
Globus and deHaas represent a type of referential incorporation. Un-
der the doctrine of incorporation by reference the provisions of a docu-
ment being interpreted may be deemed to include the provisions of another
document even though the provisions do not expressly appear in the docu-
ment being interpreted. With regard to the securities law these cases ar-
gue that incorporation of the provisions of the sections which expressly
provide a cause of action into the sections which have been determined to
imply a cause of action is authorized by the unified nature of the 1934
Act.
Though Globus and deHaas place great weight on this rationale, Mc-
Clure v. Borne Chemical Co., Inc.86 rejects this approach. In this case de-
fendant argued that the portions of § 18 of the 1934 Act 87 which provide
for a discretionary undertaking for the payment of costs should be in-
8215 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1970).
83 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(e) and 78r(b) (1970). The word "any" does not appear in § 78r(b).
84286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968).
85 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). (Citations omitted).
86292 F.2d 824 (3d Cir. 1961).
8 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1970): "In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require
an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and asse;s reasonable costs, including
reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant."
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corporated into § 10(b) and that the plaintiff in this l0b-5 action should
be required to post security for defendant's expenses. Speaking for a
unanimous court, Chief Judge Biggs not only affirmed the lower court's
discretionary decision not to require an undertaking for costs, but indicated
that the undertaking for costs element could not be incorporated into the
implied rights of action.
We conclude therefore that a shareholder who brings a derivative suit to
enforce a cause of action arising under Section 10(b), as implemented by
Rule lob-5, and Section 29(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
may not be required to post security for expenses.88
The conflict between these cases does not concern exercise of common
law power to fashion rules of decision under § 10 of the 1934 Act.
The controversy is over the proper interpretation of the 1934 Act. Globus
and deHaas hold that a proper interpretation of the Act requires that §§ 9
and 18 "are to be administered in pari materia"89 with § 10. If these sec-
tions are properly to be read in pari materia a cause of action implied un-
der § 10 would be deemed to carry with it a right of contribution between
joint defendants as a matter of statutory law rather than judicial rule mak-
ing.
Whether or not Globus and deHaas are in conflict with AcClure de-
pends upon what is implied by reading the two sections in pari materia.
Chief Judge Biggs in the McClure opinion distinguishes the security for
cost elements of § 9 from the other elements on the grounds that there is
no clear federal policy in favor of such underfakings as evidenced by the
fact that they are discretionary only even where expressly provided for.
Referring to defendant's argument for incorporation he wrote, "This argu-
ment is, of course, tenable only where the statute evinces a clear policy
in favor of security for expenses limitations.'D"
Contribution, however, is not discretionary under the securities acts
and as Globus points out to withhold contribution subverts the policy of
the Act.' Reliance upon this distinction to harmonize Globus and de-
Haas with McClure justifies the conclusion that the mandatory provisions
of §§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act are to be incorporated by reference into
any cause of action implied from any other section of the 1934 Act.
R. Incorporation of Other Provisions of the
Express Rights of Action
Both §§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act provide a statute of limitations
for actions brought under them. The limitations provisions of both sec-
tions are substantially the same and provide as follows:
88 McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 837 (3d Cir. 1961) (emphisis supplied).
89 Globus, Inc. v. Iaw Research Center, Inc., 318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
90 McClure v. Borne Chemical Co., 292 F.2d 824, 836 (3d Cr. 1961).
91318 F. Supp. 955, 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
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No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this
section unless brought within one year after discovery of the facts consti-
tuting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of ac-
tion accrued.92
Under the incorporation principle as developed in Globus and deHaas
these limitation provisions should also be incorporated into lOb-5 actions
as the applicable federal statute of limitations.
Many 10b-5 cases have raised the issue of the applicable statute of lim-
itations. In none of these cases, however, has a court concluded that the
federal statute of limitations of §§ 9 and 18 apply. The usual rule, when
a federal statute has created a right of action without stating the time with-
in which such action is to be brought, is to apply the most appropriate
statute of limitations of the forum state. 3 This rule has consistently been
followed in lob-5 cases.
The use of state statutes of limitations for iob-5 actions seems first to
have been decided in the case of Osborne v. Mallory. 4 This case involved
alleged violations of several sections of the 1933 Act for which specific
limitations are provided by the Act and upon which defendant successfully
raised the defense of the statute of limitations. The case also involved
alleged violations of § 17 of the 1933 Act and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
rule lob-5. The defenses to these charges was that no civil action could be
maintained under these sections because they do not expressly provide for
such an action. After rejecting this defense, the Court added:
The applicable statute of limitation to actions under § 17 of the 1933 Act
and § 10(b) of the 1934 Act would be that of the forum, since the two
Federal Acts do not provide any period within which suits must be brought
under those sections. 95
There was no further discussion of the issue. As authority for this po-
sition the Osborne court cited: Seabord Terminals Corp. v. Standard Oil
Co. of New Jersey;9" Dipson Theatres, Inc. v. Buffalo Theatres, Inc.;9I and
Cope v. Anderson." The Seabord and Dipson cases involved application
of a state's statute of limitations to civil actions under the antitrust statutes,
while Cope involved limitations under 12 U.S.C. §§ 63 and 64,01 relating
to statutory double liability of shareholders of insolvent national banks.
19215 U.S.C. § 78r(c) (1970). 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) substitutes the word "violation" for
the phrase "cause of action accrued."
9 3 Cambell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610 (1895); C. WRiGHT, LAW OF FEDBRAL COURTS,
251 (2d ed. 1970); Note, Federal Statutes Without Limitations Prvhions, 53 CoLUM, L REV.
68 (1953).
94 86 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1949).
95 Id. at 879.
96 24 F. Supp. 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1938).
97 8 F.R.D. 86 (W.D.N.Y. 1948).
98331 U.S. 461 (1947).
9 9 Repealed, Act of Sept. 8, 1959 PUB. L. No, 86-230, § 7, 73 Stat. 457.
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None of these three cases could have involved the issue of incorporation
because none of the statutes involved then provided for limitations in any
of their sections. These cases are authority for the rule that where there is
no federal limitation provided the state rule must be applied, but in the
face of the Globus argument for incorporation of the statute of limitations
from §§ 9 and 18 of the 1934 Act into § 10 of that act, they are not im-
pressive authority for the Osborne conclusion. Nevertheless, the Osboine
conclusion has been followed without significant discussion in all lob-5
cases which have raised the issue.
One such decision, Phillip v. J. H. Lederer Co., Inc.,100 involved alleged
violations of sections of the 1933 Act and of section 10(b) and rule 10b-5
of the 1934 Act. The defendants raised the defense of statute of limita-
tions and were successful with respect to the alleged violations of the 1933
Act. The defendants, apparently, also argued that the action based on §
10(b) of the 1934 Act was barred by the three year statute of limitation
of the 1933 Act. Referring to the 10(b) action the court wrote:
Defendants contend that such actions are also barred by the three year stat-
ute of limitations provided in the Security Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(m).
No statute of limitations is provided by the 1934 Act. Defendants urge
that where the facts upon which a civil suit for alleged violation of the
1934 Act and SEC Rule 240.10 (b)-5 is based, are the same as those upon
which a suit under the 1933 Act is brought, the limitations in 15 U.S.C.
§ 77(m) must be applied.
The cases are dear that the applicable statute of limitations for an action
based upon violations of the 1934 Act and the rules of the SEC are gov-
emed by the statute of limitations of the forum. 01
The cases cited by the court as clear authority are Osborne, Fischman v.
Raytheon AMfg. Co., 0 2 and Fratt v. Robinson.?3 The Fishman case's en-
tire discussion of the issue is as follows, "As the suit here is 'at law,' the
New York six-year statute of limitations-New York Civil Practice Act,
§ 48(2) and (5)-applies.' 0 4  In Fratt both parties conceded that the
state statute of limitations applied and the only issue was which of two rel-
evant statutes was to be used.
The Osborne-Phillip rule for 10b-5 actions has little more than its lon-
gevity to justify its continued existence. It has led to a great deal of uncer-
tainty and inconsistency over the applicable limitation to 10b-5 actions.
The litigation in Fratt concerned whether to apply one of Washington's
laws which provided for a two year limitation or one which provided for a
100 CCH FED. SEc. L REP. [1957-61 Transfer Binder] 5 91,039 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
101 Id. at 93,496-97.
102 188 F.2d 783 (2d Cir. 1951).
103 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953).
104 188 F.2d 783, 787 (2d Cir. 1951).
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three year limitation. The issue was eventually resolved in favor of the
three year limitation. According to Fischman a similar action in New York
would be subject to a six year limitation. In California section 10(b) ac-
tions are governed by a three year statute,10 5 while in Michigan the limi-
tation is six years.' 06
Nor was the use of state statutes of limitations for federal actions fos-
tered by any policy of federalism. Campbell v. Haverhill,0 an early Su-
preme Court decision establishing the use of state limitations for federal
actions where there was no applicable federal limitation, put its principle
reliance on an assumed federal policy in favor of statutes of limitations.108
This policy was to be served by adopting the state limitation only if the
state statute gave a reasonable time.100
Even considering the McClure distinction, the Osborne-Phillip rule
does not suggest any countervailing policy which should prevent the appli-
cation of the Globus principle of referential incorporation to the limita-
tions provisions of the 1934 Act.
C. The Effects of Applying the 1934 Act
Limitations to 10b-5 Actions
The result of applying the 1934 Act limitation to private actions for
violation of rule lob-5 will in most cases be to shorten the time in which
these actions may be brought. Sections 9 and 18 both provide for a limi-
tation of one year after discovery of the facts and three years after the
cause of action accrued. As indicated in part B, the state statutes of limi-
tations which have been applied often run as long as six years. This dif-
ference is accentuated by the fact that in applying state statutes of limita-
tions to § 10(b) actions the courts have used the federal tolling rule to
the effect that the statute of limitations does not begin o run until the fraud
has been discovered."' The Securities Act limitation, however, is an abso-
lute three year limitation which overrides the federal tolling rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
The opinion in Globus rests on two independent grounds. On the one
hand it holds that there is a federal common law right of contribution in
federal tort actions; on the other that the provision of the express rights of
action of the Securities Exchange Act may be referentially incorporated
105Turner v. Lundquist, 377 F.2d 44 (9th Cir. 1967).
160 Charney v. Thomas, 372 F.2d 97 (6th Cir. 1967).
107 155 U.S. 610 (1895).
108 Id. at 615.
109 Carpenter v. Hall, 311 F. Supp. 1099 (S.D. Tex. 1970).
110 Batchelor v. Legg & Co., 52 F.R.D. 553 (D. Md. 1971).
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into the implied rights of action under § 10(b) of that Act. Either argu-
ment standing alone is sufficient to support the Globus conclusion.
Neither may therefore be treated as dictum.
Tom H. Connolly
